






















III. THE NAVAL FORCES OF BELLIGERENTS 
A. THE NAVAL FORCES OF BELLIGERENTS ACCORDING TO 
THE TRADITIONAL LAW 
In warfare at sea it is important to be able to identify clearly the naval 
forces of belligerents. The reason for this is that many of the rules regu-
lating inter-belligerent and neutral-belligerent relations are dependent for 
their operation upon the possibility of distinguishing between combatants 
and non-combatants. Only the naval forces of a belligerent are permitted 
to conduct offensive operations against an enemy. In addition, the treat-
ment accorded to a belligerent vessel depends, in the first place, upon 
whether or not the vessel forms a part of the belligerent's naval forces. 
Whereas the naval vessels of a belligerent are subject to attack and destruc-
tion on sight, enemy merchant vessels are normally exempt fro1n such treat-
ment. Whereas title to a vessel in the military service of an enemy immedi-
ately vests in the government of the captor by virtue of the fact of capture, 
title to an enemy merchant vessel normally depends upon adjudication by a 
prize court. So also may the treatment of personnel taken from enemy ves-
sels differ, depending upon the status of the vessel. Finally, the traditional 
rules governing neutral-belligerent relations in naval war presuppose 
throughout the possibility of distinguishing between the naval forces of 
belligerent and belligerent merchant vessels. 1 
Although the naval forces of states comprise vessels, aircraft and per-
sonnel, the warship remains the main combatant unit in warfare at sea and 
therefore forms the principal object of inquiry. 2 While there is no multi-
lateral convention that directly defines a warship, Hague Convention VII 
(r907 ), by enumerating the conditions that must be satisfied in order to con-
vert a merchant vessel into a warship, indirectly defined the latter. In this 
Convention a vessel in order to qualify as a warship must be placed under 
the direct authority, immediate control, and the responsibility of the power 
whose flag it flies; it must bear the external marks distinguishing the war-
ships of the state under whose authority it acts; the commander of the ves-
1 See pp. 56 ff. 
2 To this extent, a discussion of lawful combatants in naval warfare differs from a similar discus-. 
sion in relation to land warfare where attention is directed primarily toward determining the sta;. 
tus of personnel. As a general rule, in naval warfare the combatant status of the vessel is sufficient 
to determine the combatant status of the personnel on board the vessel. This is equally true 
for aircraft, the combatant status of the vessel being extended to aircraft carried on board. 
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seltnust be in the service of the state, duly commissioned, and listed among 
the officers of the fighting fleet; the crew must be subject to naval discipline; 
and the vessel must observe in its operation the laws and customs of war. 
In principle, these criteria may still be regarded as furnishing the distinctive 
features of warships. 3 
Included among the commissioned naval forces of states are many vessels 
that are neither heavily armed nor capable, in fact, of carrying out offensive 
operations against an enemy. The suggestion has occasionally been put 
forward that such vessels ought not to be subject to the same treatment 
meted out to heavily armed warships. 4 However, the practice of states 
has not been to consider these naval vessels as possessing a status essentially 
different from the status of naval vessels whose primary purpose is to con-
duct offensive operations.5 It is the fact of being duly commissioned as a 
naval vessel, hence being legally competent to exercise belligerent rights at 
sea, that is the decisive consideration, and not the fact that many naval 
vessels may be only lightly armed or perhaps altogether without offensive 
armament. 6 A consequence of this incorporation into the naval forces of a 
belligerent, and the attending legal competence to exercise belligerent 
rights, is the liability to attack and destruction on sight. 
Thus commissioned naval vessels, commanded by commissioned naval 
officers and flying the naval ensign, which serve either to transport the 
armed forces of belligerents or to perform various auxiliary services to 
fighting vessels (i. e., supply tenders, colliers, etc.) are subject, in principle, 
to the same treatment as naval vessels whose purpose is to conduct offensive 
operations at sea. To this extent, at least, it would appear misleading to 
distinguish between the ''combatant'' and ''non-combatant'' naval forces 
3 See Law of Naval Warfare, Section sooc. Among writers the following statement may be 
considered to be representative: "The essential features of a warship are that her commander 
holds a commission from his state, the ship flies the flag of the navy which in many countries 
is different from that of the merchant marine, and the officers and crew are under naval dis-
cipline." Higgins and Colombos, The International Law of the Sea, (2.nd ed. rev. by C. John 
Colombos, 1951), p. 350. 
4 C. C. Hyde, for example, states that "the public belligerent ship which is impotent to 
fight through lack of armament should not be dealt with as though it were a dreadnought. 
Hence there appears to be need of a fresh classification differentiating the fighting from the non-
fighting public vessels of a belligerent, in case at least it be acknowledged that both are not to 
be treated alike by an enemy." International Law, Chiefly As Interpreted and Applied By The 
United States (2.nd. rev. ed., 1945), Vol. 3, p. 192.0. 
5 A similar position is taken by Professor Guggenheim (op. cit., p. 32.6), who points out that 
as long as a vessel makes up a part of the naval forces of a belligerent, in the sense described 
in the text above, it is immaterial whether or not the vessel is armed in the regular manner of 
warships. 
6 Exception must be made, of course, for naval hospital vessels and cartel vessels, which bear 
a special status. Although included within the naval forces of belligerents, neither of these 
categories of vessels is legally capable of exercising belligerent rights at sea, and the unlawful 
exercise of belligerent rights serves to deprive hospital and cartel vessels of the special protection 
otherwise guaranteed to them. See pp. 96-8, u6-8, 
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of belligerents. 7 Whatever differentiation in treatment is to be given to 
these two categories of naval vessels must instead be attributed to the rule 
obligating belligerents to apply only that degree of force required for the 
submission of the enemy.8 
A special problem concerns the conversion of merchant vessels into 
warships. In both World Wars the naval belligerents freely resorted to 
the practice of converting merchant vessels into warships. So long as 
such conversion was effected within the jurisdiction of the belligerent 
resorting to conversion (or within the jurisdiction of Allies) and the 
converted vessel fulfilled the requirements stipulated in Hague Convention 
VII (I907 ), requirements which have already been summarized, there was 
no serious disposition to challenge the right of converting merchant vessels 
into warships. But neither Hague Convention VII (I907) nor subsequent 
practice succeeded in settling the question as to whether merchant vessels 
may be converted on the high seas. 9 
Although the legitimacy of converting merchant vessels into warships 
must be considered as well established, it has been contended that to permit 
conversion revives, in fact if not in law, the centuries old practice of priva-
teering, a practice formally abolished by the Declaration of Paris of I856. 
There is much to be said for this view. 10 It is quite true that the control 
7 Frequently, however, this distinction results from the fact that belligerents employ vessels 
in order to perform auxiliary services to combatant naval units though without formally 
incorporating such vessels into the naval forces. Vessels so serving belligerent forces may 
retain their private ownership and merely serve under charter to the belligerents for the pur-
poses of the war. On the other hand, they may be owned by the government. In any event, 
unless commissioned as naval vessels they are not competent to exercise belligerent rights at 
sea. Thus the term "fleet auxiliaries" must be used with caution, since it may refer to vessels 
formally incorporated into the naval forces of a belligerent, and therefore competent to exercise 
belligerent rights, and those not formally incorporated. Neither the fact that both categories 
of vessels perform essentially similar services nor the fact that both categories are subject to the 
same liabilities if encountered by an enemy (i. e., attack and destruction) should serve to obscure 
this distinction. 
8 See pp. 46-5o. 
9 Conversion within neutral jurisdiction being clearly prohibited. In practice, however, 
the question as to whether merchant vessels may be converted on the high seas did not prove to 
be too significant a controversy in either World War. Far more important has been the dis-
pute over the status of vessels that have not been openly converted, but that have been "de-
fensively" armed and subjected to a considerable measure of state control (see pp. 58 ff.). A 
further unsettled point concerns the legality of reconversion as well as the place where recon-
version may take place, if permitted. 
to E. g., Stone asks whether Hague Convention VII (1907) was not "an abrogation pro tanto 
of the rule of the Declaration of Paris which abolished privateering. Analytically ... Hague 
Convention No. 7 contains no such abrogation. Yet it seems idle to blink the fact that func-
tionally the Convention sanctions the use of merchantmen to fill gaps in regular navies formerly 
filled by the privateers." op. cit., p. 576. These views echo the opinions of earlier writers. On 
the other hand, Oppenheim-Lauterpacht declares that: "The opinion ... that by permitting· 
the conversion of merchantmen into men-of-war privateering had been revived, is unfounded, 
for the rules of Convention VII in no way abrogated the rule of the Declaration of Paris that 
privateering is and remains abolished." op. cit ., p. 2.65. 
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belligerents now exercise over converted merchant vessels, and the disap-
pearance of the motive of personal gain, has served to remove some of the 
most undesirable features that were characteristic of privateering. Yet i t 
seems equally true that widespread resort to conversion serves to fulfill in 
large measure the principal function formed y accomplished through the use 
of privateers. Through the conversion of merchant ships a weak naval 
power hopes to compensate for its weakness in much the same manner that 
weak naval powers in the past compensated for t.heir weakness by the use 
of privateers. In view of the disparity that will usually exist between a 
regular warship and a converted merchant vessel, the principal use of the 
latter must be-and in practice has been-confined to forays against enemy 
merchant shipping. Rather than utilize his warships for the protection 
of merchant shipping, the belligerent against whom such converted mer-
chant vessels operate will resort to the defensive arming of his merchant 
vessels. In this manner the widespread use by belligerents of converted 
merchant vessels has been one factor, in addition to the submarine and air-
craft, that has served to lead to the present unsettled status of the distinction 
between combatants and non-combatants in naval warfare. 
B. THE PROBLEM TODAY 
The preceding considerations have dealt with the identifying character-
istics of naval forces, characteristics which are well established by the cus-
tomary practices of states. Vessels possessing these characteristics are 
competent to exercise belligerent rights at sea, are subject to attack and 
destruction at sight by the military forces of an enemy, and are obligated 
to observe certain restrictio?s when in neutral territorial waters and ports. 11 
Recent developments, however, have served to cast considerable doubt upon 
the adequacy of the characteristics established by the traditional law for 
identifying the naval forces of belligerents. The criticism is increasingly 
made that the traditional law, and the formal requirements laid down by 
this law, are no longer entirely appropriate given the circumstances under 
which the two World Wars were fought. More specifically, it has been 
held that the traditional law fails to include within the naval forces of 
belligerents many vessels which constitute at present an integral part of a 
belligerent's military effort at sea. 
This criticism undoubtedly warrants the most serious consideration. 
Despite the obvious importance of being able to identify clearly the naval 
forces of belligerents the task has never proven easy. The traditional 
law attempted to resolve some of the difficulties involved in making this 
identification by drawing a distinction between those vessels competent to 
exercise belligerent rights and those vessels not so competent but whose 
behavior might nevertheless result in liability to the same treatment as 
belligerent warships. Competence to exercise belligerent rights, as already 
11 See pp. 2.19-45 for a discussion of such restrictions. 
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noted, is vested by the traditional law only in those vessels that are formally 
incorporated into the naval forces of a belligerent, that are commanded 
by a commissioned naval officer and manned by a crew submitted to naval 
discipline, and that fly the naval ensign. On the other hand, any merchant 
vessel-including the merchant vessels of neutral states-could become 
liable to the same treatment as belligerent warships, such liability following 
from the performance of certain acts. Thus a merchant vessel actively 
resisting visit and search or performing certain acts of direct assistance to 
the military operations of a belligerent has always been considered as 
subjecting itself to . attack and possible destruction. 12 Nevertheless, this 
liability of merchant vessels did not warrant their being considered as 
bearing the same legal status as the naval forces of belligerents. In par-
ticular, the subjection of merchant vessels to treatment similar to that 
meted out to belligerent warships did not, for that reason, serve to confer 
upon such vessels the rights which belonged only to warships. 
The utility of this distinction admittedly has been substantially reduced 
today when belligerents either own and operate directly all vessels engaged 
in trade or submit the activities of privately owned vessels to far reaching 
controls. The traditional law necessarily assumed that the occasions in 
which privately owned and operated vessels would become liable to the 
same treatment as warships would be limited in number. Perhaps equally 
important was the assumption that this liability of merchant vessels would 
follow-when it did occur-as the result of acts freely undertaken by the 
owners of private vessels. These assumptions are valid only to a very 
limited extent at present, and it is with their gradual disappearance during 
the two World Wars that the principal difficulty involved in identifying 
the naval forces of belligerents is intimately related. The "defensive" 
arming of belligerent merchant vessels at the direction and expense of the 
state, the manning of defensive armament by naval gun crews, sailing under 
convoy of warships, and the incorporation of merchant vessels into the 
intelligence system of the belligerent, have become common practices. 
It may, of course, be argued that despite this ever increasing control 
exercised over merchant vessels, that despite this growing integration of 
rnerchant vessels with the military forces of a belligerent, the legal status 
of merchant vessels-whether publicly or privately owned-remains essen-
tially unchanged so long as such vessels do not satisfy the strict require-
ments of warships as established by the traditional law. 13 The accuracy 
12 See pp. 56-7, 67-70, 319-u., 3361. 
13 In one opinion of the American-German Mixed Claims Commission, established after 
World War I, adjudicating claims for compensation of losses suffered through the destruction 
of ships by Germany or her allies, the following conclusion was reached: "Neither (a) the 
arming for defensive purposes of a merchantman, nor (b) the manning of such armament by·a 
naval gun crew, nor (c) her routing by the Navy Department of the United States for the pur-
pose of avoiding the enemy, nor (d) the following by the civilian master of such merchantman 
of instructions given by the Navy Department for the defense of the ship when attacked by or 
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of this contention must be found, however, largely in the identification of 
.. legal status" with the competence to exercise belligerent rights at sea. 
It cannot prejudice the possible conclusion that this lack of competence 
to exercise belligerent rights does not-at the same time-also serve to 
confer upon merchant vessels continued exemption from the liability of 
commissioned naval vessels to attack and possible destruction. 14 It should 
further be observed that if the principal purpose of restricting the legal 
status of naval forces to those vessels possessing the characteristics of war-
ships as established by the traditional law is to preserve the distinction 
between combatants and non-combatants in naval warfare this purpose is 
not being well served. For the apparent effect of retaining the traditional 
requirements in a period when merchant vessels are increasingly integrated 
into the military effort of belligerents is to deprive such vessels of the im-
munities of non-combatants while at the same time denying them the full 
rights conferred upon combatants in warfare at sea. 
C. AERIAL FORCES IN WARFARE AT SEA 
It is hardly possible to assert that the identifying characteristics of com-
batant forces in aerial warfare has as yet been resolved in a definitive 
manner. In the absence of international convention regulating this aspect 
of aerial warfare such regulation as does exist must be based either upon 
an application to aerial warfare of the rules identifying legitimate com-
batants in naval or land warfare or upon the actual practices of belligerents 
in the conduct of aerial warfare. Both of these possibilities involve certain 
difficulties. The practices of belligerents during World War II were not 
always uniform, and even where a marked degree of uniformity was ap-
parent doubt may remain as to whether so short a practice is to be considered 
as satisfying the requirements of customary law .15 The application ''by 
analogy'' of the requirements lawful combatants must meet either in naval 
or land warfare is objectionable if only for the reason that aerial warfare 
is a distinct form of waging war, which cannot be easily assimilated to 
the older forms of warfare. The differences existing between land and 
naval warfare with respect to the identification of legitimate combatants 
in danger of attack by the enemy, nor (e) her seeking the protection of a convoy and submitting 
herself to naval instructions as to route and operation for the purpose of avoiding the enemy, 
nor all of these combined will suffice to impress such merchantman with a military character." 
At the same time, however, the Commission expressly disclaimed passing judgment upon 
whether any of the conditions enumerated above entitled Germany, according to the existing 
rules of international law, to attack and destroy allied merchant vessels. U. S. Naval War 
College, International Law Decisions and Notes, I92J, pp. 189-90, 2.14. 
14 See pp. 55-70 for a detailed discussion of the conditions under which belligerent merchant 
vessels may be attacked and destroyed either with or without prior warning. 
15 See pp. 2-7 ff. 
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should constitute a warning against attempts to apply to aerial warfare 
rules operative to troops on land or to vessels at sea. 16 
In this study the problem of identifying legitimate combatants in aerial 
warfare is limited to aircraft which either make up a part of the naval forces 
of belligerents or which participate in operations of a naval character. In 
the light of this qualification and of the relevant practices of World War II 
the following tentative conclusions may be drawn. In principle, the char-
acteristics considered essential to qualify a vessel to exercise belligerent 
rights at sea have been applied to the conduct of aerial warfare as well. 
During World War II there was a general disposition on the part of the 
belligerents to consider as entitled to exercise belligerent rights only those 
aircraft that were incorporated into the military forces of the state, that 
were commanded and manned by military personnel, and that showed such 
marking as would clearly indicate nationality and military character. 17 
16 Thus an element of uncertainty remains as to whether in naval warfare the identifying 
characteristics of lawful combatants should attach to the aircraft (as in naval warfare to the 
vessel), to the personnel manning the aircraft (as in land warfare to troops), or to both aircraft 
and personnel. J. M. Spaight, Air Power and War Rights (3rd. ed., 1947), pp. 76 ff., contends 
that in aerial warfare combatant identification must be primarily attached to the aircraft, that 
aircraft are obligated to use the military markings of their state, and that personnel are not 
required to wear a uniform (identity tokens being sufficient to establish combatant status). 
It is apparent that Spaight considers aerial warfare to resemble, in this respect at least, naval 
warfare. Stone (op. cit., p. 612.), on the other hand, questions these conclusions, and while 
admitting that practice to date suggests an ''inchoate prohibition" against the use of false 
markings by aircraft, asserts that the details of any clear prohibition to this effect have yet 
to emerge. 
17 See Law of Naval Warfare, Section sood.-For a review of World War II practices regarding 
combatant quality in aerial warfare, see Spaight, op. cit., pp. 76-107.-Articles 13 and 14 of 
the unratified 192.3 Rules of Aerial Warfare, drafted by the Commission of Jurists at The Hague, 
stated that: "Belligerent aircraft are alone entitled to exercise belligerent rights . . . A mili-
tary aircraft shall be under the command of a person duly commissioned or enlisted in the 
military service of the State; the crew must be exclusively military." The General Report 
on these provisions of the 192.3 Rules declared that: "Belligerent rights at sea can now only be 
exercised by units under the direct authority, immediate control and responsibility of the State. 
This same principle should apply to aerial warfare. Belligerent rights should therefore only 
be exercised by military aircraft . . . Operations of war involve the responsibility of the 
State. Units of the fighting forces must, therefore, be under the direct control of persons 
responsible to the State. For the same reason the crew must be exclusively military in order 
that they may be subject to military discipline." U. S. Naval War College, lntemational Law 
Documents, I924, p. II4· 
